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This paper describes assumptions and procedures used to perform thermal 
damage analysis caused by post loss-of-coolant-accident (LOCA) hydrogen 
deflagration at Three Mile Island Unit 2 Reactor. Examination of available 
photographic evidence yields data on the extent and range of thermal and burn 
damage. Thermal damage to susceptible material in accessible regions of the 
reactor building was distributed in non-uniform patterns. No clear explanation 
for non-uniformity was found in examined evidence, e.g., burned materials were 
adjacent to materials that appear similar but were not burned. Because these 
items were in proximity to vertical openings that extend the height of the 
reactor building, we assume the unburned materials preferentially absorbed 
water vapor during periods of high, local steam concentration. A control pen­
dant from the polar crane located in the top of the reactor building sustained 
asymmetric burn damage of decreasing degree from top to bottom. Evidence sug­
gests the polar-crane pendant side that experienced heaviest damage was exposed 
to intense radiant energy from a transient fire plume in the reactor contain­
ment volume. Simple hydrogen-fire-exposure tests and heat transfer calcula­
tions appoximate the degree of damage found on inspected materials from the 
containment building and support for an estimated 8% pre-fire hydrogen. 
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
About 10 hours after the 28 March 1979 loss-of-coolant accident began at 
the Three Mile Island Unit 2 Reactor Building, a hydrogen deflagration of 
undetermined extent occurred inside the reactor building. Hydrogen was 
generated as a result of reaction between zirconium nuclear fuel rod cladding 
and steam produced as the reactor core was uncovered. Ignition of the 
hydrogen-and-air mixture release after the breach of the reactor-coolant drain 
tank (RCDT) rupture disk resulted in nominal thermal and overpressure damage 
to susceptible materials in all accessible regions of TMI-2. Initiation of 
burn and subsequent termination of induced fires are indicated by data from a 
variety of pressure and temperature sensors located throughout the containment 
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Seconds After 1349 Hours on 28 March 1979 
Fig. 1. Pressures recorded 
during the burn from OTSG 
(once-through steam genera­
tor) pressure transmitters 
and pressure switch actua­
tion times. Corresponding 
average temperature via pro­
cedure described in Ref. 1 
added to psig scale. 
volume. Activation of the building spray system is defined by inflection and 
increase in the negative slope of interior-pressure-reduction curves 
(Fig. I ) . 1 
The hydrogen-in-air concentration [H2] was estimated to be approximately 
6 to 8%. At this concentration range, propagation of flame is possible upward 
and horizontally in quiescent conditions, but not downward; however, turbulent 
conditions, established circulation patterns, and the ambient absolute humidity 
of the mixture can perturb propagation patterns in ways that are only qualita­
tively understood.2'3 Assuming uniform mixing of 8% hydrogen-in-air concen­
tration and induction of adequate turbulence in internal circulation flows, 
flame speeds to 5 m/sec (16 ft/sec) are possible — even in the presence of 
saturated steam environments.^ 
A cross section of the reactor building (Fig. 2) and plan view of the 
main (347-ft) operations level (Fig. 3) show the regions of thermal and burn 
df ige. Given that few operational ignition sources were available in the 
iv.actor building above the 305-ft level, the time delay to achieve peak over­
pressure is consistent with an ignition location in the basement. The 
potential electrical shorting of electrical control systems caused by basement 
water spillage and the frequency of steam release from the reactor coolant 
drain-tank pressure-release system supports this assumption. 
Thermal damage to fine fuels* indicates general exposure of all 
susceptible interior surfaces to fire with the exception of random materials 
including fabric ties of unknown composition, 2 x 4 framing lumber on both the 
305-ft and 347-ft levels, and various polymeric materials. These unburned 
items are evident in photographic and video surveys, and were visually 
reconfirmed by various entry^participants. This pattern is reported in 
several preliminary reports. 5' 6 Possible mechanisms to prevent thermal 
*Fine fuel is defined as a flammable material with high svirface-to-volume 
ratio. 
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Tap of doma El 473 ft 
Pig. 2. Cross section of the 
TMI-2 reactor containment 
building. 
damage to these items include: 
1. Preferential absorption of water from saturated atmosphere, 
requiring greater thermal exposure to produce thermal damage. 
2. Direct exposure to high-concentration steam and water vapor, 
requiring greater thermal exposure to produce thermal damage. 
3. Shielding from thermal radiation by position or geometric obscuration. 
4. Shielding from the expanding flame front or convectively driven hot 
gases by physical obstruction. 
Although photographic surveys of internal reactor building vistas, 
ensembles, items, and surfaces were abundant (approx 600 photos from 29 
entries), clarity of burn detail in most photographs was not adequate for 
diagnostic purposes. However, the extent of thermal damage was defined 
(Figs. 2 and 3) as regions where thermally degraded materials were located, 
photographed, and, in some cases, extracted from the reactor building for 
further examination. 
Ignition of a uniformly distributed near-lower-limit mixture of hydrogen 
in air, spreading from basement ignition sources to the top of the reactor 
building dome by turbulent propagation modes, occurred in the time period 
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Fig. 3. Thermal and burn 
damage on the 347-ft level. 
indicated in Fig. 1. The flame front would have been at an adiabatic flame 
temperature of about 700°C to 800°C ( approx 1000°K). 
Exact paths of flame propagation are undefined. Because of low hydrogen 
concentration, preferential flame spread was upward in quiescent atmosphere; 
however, air motion produced by reactor building coolers, steam/hydrogen 
release from the rupture disk line of the RCDT and natural convection processes 
caused turbulent flow conditions which greatly modify flame spread rates. The 
source of major hydrogen release was located near the west open stairway on the 
undersurface of the 305-ft level plane. Henri and Postma conclude that the 
primary entry path of the hydrogen-and-steam mixture to the total reactor 
building above the basement (282 ft) level was through this stairwell. How 
these gases from the rupture disk line interacted with total ventilation pat­
terns is not known. This may be a moot point since, by the time ignition 
occurred, hydrogen in the reactor building was undoubtedly uniformly mixed. 
Identification of a specific ignition source is not possible from availa­
ble documentation; however, two potential basement source-types are considered. 
(1) Several circuit boxes, instrument racks, meters, and control components 
were at various locations around D-rings and containment walls at undefined 
(as built) heights above the basement floor. Thus, failure of circuit 
components may have been caused by immersion in water. (2) Plant operators 
who control core and reactor building conditions may have produced ignition 
arcs from control components perturbed by thermal or mechanical effects of 
reactor excursion.' The inner perimeter of the reactor building basement 
had no obstructions to block or blind flow of gases outside of the D-ring. 
Approximately 10% of the cooled gases from the cooling system plenum 
(25,000 ft3/min) was distributed to the basement (outside of the D-ring) 
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through committed ducting. The only exit paths for these gases were the 4-in. 
seismic gaps (a space that physically separates each floor level from the 
recctor building) and the open stairwell that extended from the basement space 
to the 347-level without barrier. If ignition occurred at sources away from 
the open stairwell, the preferred flame propagation would be upward through 
the seismic gap, and above the 305-ft level, through the grating in the 347-ft 
level floor. Horizontal spread would occur, but at a slower rate, even during 
turbulent propagation conditions. Ample evidence exists on the 347-ft level 
to confirm flame propagation through the seismic gap regions and the floor 
grating. 
At the peak pressure rise of about 28 psig during the hydrogen burn, the 
adiabatic temperature rise during combustion of 6 to 8% hydrogen-in-air mixture 
is about 1000°K. At this temperature, calculated exposure radiative and 
convective flux (qt) from an optically thick combustion plume is 
2.2 W/cm2 < q t < 4.5 W/cm2 ( a ) 
For c a l c u l a t i o n a l purpose assume emittance of 0 . 5 , then q r = eoT 4 = 
2.8 W/cm2. This range i s approximate because we assume values for combus­
t i o n plume emittance ( E ) a t t h e l i m i t s of the range 0 . 2 < e < 0 . 8 . I t 
i s q u i t e p o s s i b l e t h a t E could be la rger for o p t i c a l l y th ick hydrogen 
combustion plumes. Heat t r a n s f e r coef f ic ien t fo r minimum and maximum 
convective heat t r ans f e r i s based on gas ve loc i t y (u„) a t the l i m i t s of t h e 
range: 
3 m/sec < u < 12 m/sec 
At uCT = 12 m/sec and L = 1 h = 1.2 x 1 0 J K(Pr) 1/3 R e
1 / 2 
( b ) 
2 . 3 3 x 
10" W/cm 2 K°, q c = hA ( T s - Too) = 1.6 w/cm 2 . T o t a l h e a t t r a n s f e r 
t o s u r f a c e ; q^. = q r + q c = 4 . 5 W/cm • 
EXAMINATION OF TMI MATERIALS 
To e s t i m a t e t h e i n t e n s i t y of t h e r m a l e x p o s u r e t o damaged m a t e r i a l s and t o 
a n a l y z e t h e r m a l damage p a t t e r n s , i t i s n e c e s s a r y t o examine t h e i r c o n d i t i o n and 
t o d e t e r m i n e t h e i r c o m p o s i t i o n . P h o t o g r a p h i c e v i d e n c e i s i n a d e q u a t e f o r such 
a p p r a i s a l . We examined m a t e r i a l s removed from t h e r e a c t o r b u i l d i n g , a n d recom­
mended r e m o v a l of a d d i t i o n a l m a t e r i a l s f o r a n a l y s i s . We examined t h e f o l l o w i n g 
m a t e r i a l s : * 
L e v e l 305 L e v e l 347 P o l a r Crane 
1 . P o l y p r o p y l e n e 
b u c k e t 
Plywood b o a r d 
Wood from t o o l box 
Two r a d i a t i o n s i g n s , 
p r o b a b l y p o l y e t h y l e n e 
Hemp and p o l y p r o p y l e n e 
r o p e 
C a t a l o g r e m a i n s 
T e l e p h o n e and 
a s s o c i a t e d w i r e 
1. F i re ex t ingu i she r 
2. Hypalon polar-crane 
pendant jacket control 
box 
•Available July 1983. 
(a) Bell telephone at THI (b) charred manual on electrical 
box 
(c) Plywood panel (back) (d) Plywood panel (front) 
Fig. 4. Hydrogen-burned in-containment materials extracted from TMI-2. 
These materials retain residual radioactive contamination. Consequently, 
all examinations were performed under radiologically-safe conditions. Chemical 
or physical analytical procedures could only be done with contaminated or 
easily decontaminated instruments. We were unable to locate expendable 
diagnostic equipment; therefore, our examination of extracted materials was 
limited to detailed photography and macroscopic observations. 
Figure 4 shows photographs of plywood on the reactor building south wall 
and remains of an instruction or maintenance manual located on the reactor 
building north wall, both ignited by fire propagation through the seismic gap 
and/or radiant exposure from combustion gases in reactor building free volume. 
In Fig. 4(a) note the wires along the wall also exhibit burn trauma. Figures 
4(c) and 4(d) show the front and the rear surface of the plywood panel after 
it was extracted from the south wall of the reactor building, over the seismic 
gap. Bot'i) sides are charred, as are edges and holes through which wire ties 
penetrate. Surface char condition indicates the panel ignited to flaming 
combustion for a short period before self-extinguishing or being quenched by 
the reactor spray system. Regardless of the ignition source location, it is 
apparent that a hydrogen-and-air flame front traversed most of the reactor 
building volume above (and probably below) the 305-ft level. Duration of this 
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propagation was about 12 sec. Slow temperature decay before operation of the 
building spray system ensured thermal exposure to combustible or thermally 
sensitive surfaces was sufficient to produce thermal damage and/or ignition of 
these materials, particularly in regions where volume of the combustion plume 
was optically thick. 
THERMAL MEASUREMENTS ON EXEMPLAR MATERIALS 
To augment this analysis, we located exemplar materials generally similar 
to those removed from the reactor building. Response properties of the 
exemplar materials were measured in a thermal gravimetric analyzer (TGA) to 
ascertain the temperature range of thermal degradation and weight-loss rates. 
Figure 5 shows TGA patterns for ABS (acrylonitrile butadiene styrene), a 
standard material from the National Bureau of Standards (UBS) used as a 
control for smoke tests. ABS is similar to telephone body material. 
Thermograms are obtained by isothermally heating milligram-sized samples 
of materials, supported on a micro balance, at a constant temperature rate. 
Weight loss with temperature indicates thermal degradation mode and mechanism. 
The temperature range of maximum weight loss indicates critical conditions for 
producing potentially ignitable pyrolyzates. Figure 5 shows that UBS-ABS 
flammable pyrolyzates are produced in the temperature range of 370° to 500°C, 
leaving about 20% inert materials as residue. These pyrolyzates are flammable 
which, with an external ignition source, will ignite within this range. 
The temperature corresponding to the median of weight loss during the 
first major weight-loss experience in any polymer can be used to estimate the 
condition where the rate of thermal destruction is maximum, as in the case of 
pyrolyzate production. Thus, we can use this temperature to define the time 
when subject materials are most susceptible to ignition. 
Using standard solutions for transient heat conduction in semi-infinite 
solids with constant thermal properties, it is possible to calculate the time 
at which a material's surface will attain a specific temperature upon exposure 
to constant thermal flux levels. Adjustments should be made to account for 
re-radiation heat losses from exposure surfaces and latent heat processes 
required to produce pyrolyzates from polymers. With specific surface tempera­
ture, exposure heat flux, and defined thermal constants, the time required to 
reach this temperature is determined by solution of the differential equation 
for transport heat flow in a semi-infinite solid: 
where 
2 
kpc D , (1) 
q t = total thermal exposure, 
T g = surface temperature, 
kpc_ = material thermal constants. 
Polymeric materials present in most items in common use have thickness of 
order of 0.2 cm. At this thickness Biot number is less than 1. In distributed 
systems, thermal penetration time for such materials is Ax2/<* and for 
properties of PVC or PMMA, this time is approx 30 sec. 
Times calculated using this equation should be short relative to those 
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100 200 300 400 
Temperature (°C) 
500 600 Fig. 5. Thermogram of NBS-ABS. In air, 20 C per 
min heating rate. 
for real materials which experience both thermal and mass convection heat 
losses. To account for these losses, we adjust q t by subtracting from it the 
surface radiation energy at the specified critical surface temperature and the 
mass convection losses (the product of surface mass loss and latent heat of 
pyrolysis). The resultant effective energy exposure rate q e replaces q t 
in Eq. (1), giving a longer time to attain the critical temperature level. 
Values for time obtained by using both q t and qg in Eq. (1) bound the time 
range between exposure of an inert solid and a solid experiencing both 
re-radiation and latent heat losses. Critical temperature for the three 
materials is estimated to be 600°K, and thermal exposure energy is the high 
value calculated from both convective and radiative exposure during combustion 
of 8% hydrogen in air (q t = 4.5 W/cm 2) . 













Times to attain critical temperature conditions in these materials are the 
same order of duration as those recorded during the hydrogen burn in free vol­
umes of the reactor building. Thus, all susceptible materials exposed to this 
energy should (and did) experience thermal degradation and/or flaming ignition. 
HYDROGEN-FIRE-EXPOSURE TESTS 
Thermal constants of most polymeric materials are defined only for virgin 
compounds. It is virtually impossible to calculate thermal response properties 
of commercially available polymers because additives, retardants, and fillers 
modify fundamental properties; however, simple hydrogen-fire-exposure tests may 
indicate accident exposure conditions. To assess this possibility, we con­
ducted selected exposure tests on our exemplar materials using a Meeker burner 
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adjusted to a fully pre-mixed burning mode. Size and thickness of these 
samples were as we found them. The tests were crude and no attempts were made 
to conform to condition other than to confine time of exposure to the range 
indicated by TMI-2 pressure measurements. Flow was adjusted to produce a 
measured flame temperature of 833°K (note: during measurement, the 20-mil 
thermocouple was incandescent, so measured temperature was substantially lower 
than actual flame temperature). A simple-copper-slug calorimeter measurement 
of total thermal flux indicated an exposure flux of 6 W/cm . This level of 
flame temperature and thermal flux was within reasonable limits of projected 
TMI-2 accident measurements and estimated reactor exposure conditions. Thus, 
resulting data trends should be similar to thermal response variations of 
materials that suffered hydrogen-flame exposure in the TMI-2 reactor building. 
Similarity of thermal damage sustained by materials from the reactor 
building and those used in the small-scale test were encouraging. Both dura­
tion and intensity of test thermal exposure is in the range of estimated ther­
mal fluxes extant during the reactor building burn. Note that these are very 
simplistic tests. No attempt was made to refine temperature or thermal energy 
measurement. We have no illusion as to the distribution of convective or 
radiative contribution from the test burner; however, the results give data 
trends which are intuitively acceptable. 
CONCLUSIONS 
On the basis of 
1. Photographic and video surveys of the TMI-2 reactor building interior, 
2. Visual and photographic analysis of materials extracted from the reactor 
building, 
3. Macro- and micro-experiments with materials of composition generically 
similar to that of extracted TMI samples, and 
4. Calculations using proposed physical conditons and assumed material 
properties, 
the following conclusions are posed: 
1. Hydrogen concentration in the reactor building prior to burn is 
confirmed to be about 8%, as calculated by analyzers of TMI-2 
pressure and temperature records. 
2. No defined path for hydrogen propagation has been established. 
3. The most probable ignition site for the hydrogen b u m is in the 
basement volume outside of the D-ring: radial location is not defined. 
4. Thermal degradation of most susceptible materials on all levels is 
consistent with direct flame contact from hydrogen fire. 
5. The directional character of damage to lower pendant length suggests 
potential geometric limitation of the hydrogen-fire plume. 
6. The total burn pattern of the plywood tack board for the south-wall 
telephone on the 347-ft level indicates flame propagation through the 
seismic gap. 
7. Lack of thermal degradation of random, thermally susceptible materials 
may result from preferential moisture absorption. Because of the 
random nature of this evidence, it is not likely that undamaged 
materials resulted from selective shadowing. 
8. Burn patterns in the reactor building indicate that the dome region 
above the 406-ft level was uniformly exposed to direct hydrogen flame; 
the region between the 406-ft level and the top of the D-ring was partially 
exposed to hydrogen flame (most likely in the south and east quadrants); 
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and, the damage on the 305-ft level was geometrically similar to uhat above 
the 347-ft level but less severe. 
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